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m. 11 Oct 1947
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| Born |
19 Feb 1928 |
Hendersonville, Henderson, North Carolina, United States  |
| Died |
6 Oct 2020 |
Boynton Beach, Palm Beach, Florida, United States |
| Buried |
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| Father |
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| Mother |
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| Born |
6 Jul 1952 |
Washington, District of Columbia, United States |
| Died |
9 Feb 2017 |
California, United States |
| Buried |
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| Notes |
- In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Himelfarb, 355 Md. 671 (1999), the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that summary judgment was not proper because the insureds created a question of fact whether they substantially complied with a proof-of-loss provision in their policy. In exchange for a loan, Herbert and Frances Himelfarb maintained a security interest in the property of Baltimore Woodworks. The property was stored in the Himelfarb's warehouse. Baltimore Woodworks defaulted on the loan and filed for bankruptcy. Before the property could be sold at a bankruptcy sale, approximately $32,000 worth of property was stolen from the warehouse. The Himelfarbs had an insurance policy with Hartford. In order to comply with the policy, they needed to meet a 60 day time limit on filing a proof of loss with Hartford. They told Hartford that they would not be able to make a full accounting of the loss until they had a chance to compare the amount of property available for sale with the amount of property before the theft. This would take longer than the 60 day time limit under the policy with Hartford. The Baltimore City Circuit Court granted summary judgment for Hartford. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed. Affirming the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, under the policy, furnishing a complete proof of loss within the 60 day time limit was not an express condition precedent to Hartford's duty to pay the claim. The Court clarified its holding by stating that the 60 day period "affects only the time when Hartford's obligation to pay becomes presently enforceable." The Court also held that substantial compliance with the proof-of-loss provision was sufficient. Thus, summary judgment was improper because the Himelfarbs had presented a question of fact as to whether they had substantially complied with the policy's 60 day time limit.
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